Critics of Nāgārjuna often begin with the charge of nihilism. Because he insists that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, some readers conclude that he is denying reality altogether, including moral causation, spiritual progress, and even the meaningfulness of the Buddhist path. From this perspective, emptiness seems to dissolve the very distinctions—wholesome and unwholesome, liberation and bondage—that practice depends upon. The concern is that if nothing has any intrinsic nature, then ethical responsibility and the consequences of actions risk becoming unintelligible or trivial.

Closely related is the accusation of self‑refutation. Nāgārjuna famously argues that all views are empty, and that no thesis can ultimately be maintained. Opponents ask whether this claim applies to his own position: if the view that “all views are empty” is itself empty, they worry that it undermines its own authority. Furthermore, his use of rigorous reasoning to show the limits or failure of all reasoning is seen by some as logically inconsistent, as though logic were being used to discredit logic itself. This has led to the portrayal of his method as a form of extreme skepticism that threatens the possibility of any stable knowledge.

Another line of criticism focuses on the status of conventional truth. Nāgārjuna distinguishes between conventional and ultimate truth, yet critics argue that his strong emphasis on emptiness risks eroding the reliability and significance of the conventional world. If everyday distinctions and causal relations have no ultimate foundation, then ordinary discourse, ethical conduct, and religious practice can appear groundless or even meaningless. Some Buddhist realists, for this reason, maintained that at least certain phenomena must possess some kind of inherent existence if doctrine and practice are to retain coherence.

Finally, there are objections concerning causation and practical life. Nāgārjuna equates emptiness with dependent arising, but critics contend that if all things are empty, it becomes difficult to explain how cause and effect can genuinely function; causation seems to require relata that are more than mere conceptual constructions. This worry extends into the practical sphere: if reality is relentlessly deconstructed, communication, decision‑making, and engagement with the world may seem paralyzed. From this vantage point, his philosophy can appear excessively negative—brilliant in its critique of reification, yet offering no clear positive account of what reality is, and thus leaving many seekers unsure how to live these insights in daily life.