In Nāgārjuna’s thought, logic functions as a precise but provisional instrument, a means rather than a metaphysical ground. His analyses do not aim to construct a new doctrine about reality, but to dismantle all fixed theses, especially the belief in inherent existence (svabhāva). Through rigorous reasoning, he shows that any attempt to assert reality as simply existing, not existing, both, or neither collapses under scrutiny. Logic thus serves to reveal the limits of conceptual thought and to prevent reification of any particular standpoint.

The hallmark of this method is the use of prasaṅga, or consequentialist reasoning, which operates largely through reductio ad absurdum. Instead of putting forward positive assertions, Nāgārjuna takes an opponent’s claim and demonstrates that, if accepted, it leads to contradictions or untenable consequences. This strategy is closely linked with the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi), where each of the four possible positions about a phenomenon—existence, non-existence, both, neither—is examined and shown to be logically incoherent when treated as ultimately true. In this way, logic becomes a disciplined practice of negation that loosens attachment to any dogmatic view.

Such logical scrutiny is especially evident in Nāgārjuna’s treatment of causation and related topics like motion, self, time, and the relation of parts and wholes. By showing that neither self-caused, other-caused, both, nor uncaused origination can withstand analysis, he clears the ground for understanding dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) without positing any underlying essence. Logic here protects the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism, revealing that phenomena are empty (śūnyatā) of inherent existence yet still function conventionally. This careful balance guards against both reifying emptiness and sliding into nihilism.

At the same time, Nāgārjuna’s use of logic is explicitly therapeutic and soteriological. The purpose of these arguments is to undercut clinging to views (dṛṣṭi) and to dissolve the conceptual proliferations (prapañca) that sustain suffering. When the grip of such views is released, wisdom (prajñā) can recognize the emptiness and interdependence of all phenomena without needing to assert any final conceptual truth. Even logical analysis itself is ultimately seen as empty and is to be relinquished once its liberating work is done. Logic, in this vision, is a skillful means that guides the mind toward a non-conceptual realization of the middle way, rather than a permanent scaffold for a philosophical system.