Madhyamaka’s articulation of śūnyatā has always attracted both admiration and critique, from Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. One of the most persistent challenges is the accusation of nihilism: if all phenomena are empty of inherent nature, it can appear that nothing really exists or matters, threatening the meaningfulness of karma, ethics, and liberation. Abhidharma schools, some Yogācāra thinkers, and various Hindu philosophers have pressed this point, worrying that such radical deconstruction erodes any stable ground for practice. Madhyamaka responds by distinguishing between ultimate and conventional truth, insisting that emptiness concerns only inherent existence, not the functioning of the conventional world. Within this framework, dependent arising and ethical causality still operate, and emptiness is seen as what allows phenomena to arise and function at all.

Another major line of criticism targets the internal coherence of the view. Nyāya logicians, some Vedāntins, and later Buddhist thinkers have argued that if all views are empty, then the claim “all phenomena are empty” must itself be empty, raising the specter of self-refutation. Madhyamaka replies that it does not posit a positive metaphysical thesis to defend, but rather employs a dialectical method (often through reductio arguments) to reveal the untenability of any claim to inherent existence. Emptiness itself is said to be “empty,” meaning it is not a new absolute but a tool for loosening reification. This stance also provokes worries about logic and language: if subject, predicate, and universals lack fixed natures, critics ask how inference and reliable knowledge can remain meaningful. Madhyamaka answers that reasoning and discourse retain validity on the conventional level, as long as they are not mistaken for ultimate realities.

There are also challenges concerning the practical and experiential implications of emptiness. Some Buddhist scholastics and modern interpreters fear that relentless negation risks quietism, apathy, or moral relativism, leaving practitioners with nothing firm to guide conduct. Others suggest that the claim of emptiness seems to contradict the vivid solidity of everyday experience, in which things appear quite real and substantial. Madhyamaka interprets such perceptions as rooted in ignorance and habitual grasping, and maintains that realizing emptiness actually undercuts ego-clinging and deepens compassion. From this perspective, insight into interdependence is meant to energize ethical engagement rather than undermine it, though critics remain wary that such subtlety can be easily misunderstood.

Finally, significant debates arise both across and within traditions about how to interpret emptiness itself. Yogācāra thinkers have sometimes faulted Madhyamaka for an overly negative approach that, in their view, fails to acknowledge the continuity of consciousness or mind-stream underlying experience. Advaita Vedānta philosophers, for their part, argue that the rejection of inherent existence is incomplete without affirming Brahman as an ultimately real substratum, regarding Madhyamaka as overly destructive. Within Madhyamaka, the Svātantrika–Prāsaṅgika dispute turns on how far one can or should go in using positive arguments and independent syllogisms, and later Tibetan discussions contrast more purely negational readings of emptiness with those that emphasize a luminous, positive quality of ultimate reality. These controversies show that the middle way of emptiness remains a living, contested project, continually tested by questions about coherence, experience, and the demands of spiritual practice.