In Madhyamaka, the “Middle Way” names a vision of reality that steers between two mistaken extremes: eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism (śāśvatavāda) asserts that things possess an inherent, permanent essence or self-nature (svabhāva), as though they were self-established and independent. Nihilism (ucchedavāda), by contrast, claims that nothing truly exists at all, or that things are simply annihilated without remainder, undermining causality and meaningful responsibility. The Middle Way refuses both of these poles, holding that such rigid positions distort how phenomena actually appear and function.

Instead, this perspective emphasizes dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda): all phenomena arise in dependence upon causes, conditions, and conceptual designation. Because they are dependently originated, they lack any independent, intrinsic nature; this absence of inherent existence is what is meant by emptiness (śūnyatā). Emptiness is not a separate substance or hidden essence, but simply the fact that things do not exist from their own side, in and of themselves. Yet, precisely because they are dependently arisen, phenomena do exist and operate on the conventional level, participating in causal relations, language, and ordinary social life.

The Middle Way thus holds that things are neither truly, inherently existent nor utterly nonexistent. They are empty of svabhāva, yet they function conventionally and can be spoken of, relied upon, and engaged with. This is sometimes expressed through the distinction between ultimate truth and conventional truth: ultimately, all phenomena are empty; conventionally, they appear and work within the web of dependent origination. Even emptiness itself is not exempt from this analysis and is understood in terms of dependence rather than as an absolute ground.

Seen in this light, the Middle Way is not a compromise between two dogmas, but a radical reorientation of how reality is understood. It loosens the grip of reifying what appears, without falling into the despair of denying appearance altogether. By avoiding both the solidifying of things as ultimately real and the dismissal of their conventional efficacy, this view opens a path in which insight into emptiness and trust in everyday functioning can coexist without contradiction.