Critiques of Nāgārjuna’s teaching on emptiness often begin with the charge of nihilism. Because emptiness is said to deny inherent existence in all phenomena, some readers fear that this dissolves the reality of karma, rebirth, and liberation, and with them any stable ground for ethical responsibility. From this perspective, if nothing ultimately exists, moral distinctions appear arbitrary and spiritual practice seems to lose its point. The concern extends to everyday life as well: if all things are empty, the world can seem like a mere illusion without weight or consequence. Such worries give rise to accusations of moral relativism and spiritual quietism, as though the doctrine invited indifference rather than compassion or effort.

A second major line of criticism targets the apparent self-refuting nature of emptiness. If all phenomena are empty, then the very teaching of emptiness must also lack inherent truth, which raises doubts about its philosophical coherence. Critics argue that using reasoning to show that all views are empty risks undermining the validity of reasoning itself, leaving no secure standpoint from which to speak. This has led some to see Nāgārjuna’s method as a kind of dialectical destruction that tears down positions without offering a positive account that could withstand its own critique. The tension here is between a radical deconstruction of all views and the need for a stable framework in which meaningful discourse and practice can occur.

There are also epistemological and practical concerns about how emptiness relates to conventional reality and spiritual practice. If all things, including cognitive processes, lack inherent existence, some question how reliable knowledge, discriminating wisdom, or even ordinary perception can be justified. Others worry that the strong emphasis on emptiness obscures or even misrepresents dependent origination, making it difficult to explain how causality, the diversity of phenomena, and the path of practice retain significance. This can create a sense of tension between the ultimate level of emptiness and the conventional level of meditation, ritual, and ethical conduct, raising doubts about how bondage and liberation can be meaningfully spoken of if both are said to be empty.

Finally, critics have raised logical and metaphysical objections to the way emptiness is articulated. The use of the tetralemma and similar strategies has been judged by some as logically incoherent, as though they violate basic norms of rational argument. Philosophers from other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools have claimed that some kind of substantial existence—whether of a self, of foundational elements, or of intrinsic natures—is required to make sense of explanation, causation, and enduring identity. From this vantage point, the Madhyamaka analysis appears too destructive, leaving no ontological footing from which to account for the very phenomena it seeks to clarify.