Critiques of Yogācāra often begin with the charge that “mind-only” veers toward a kind of idealism or even solipsism. By asserting that what appears as external reality is in fact a projection or representation of consciousness, the tradition is said to risk reifying mind itself as a subtle substance, thereby undermining the broader Buddhist insistence on emptiness. From this perspective, consciousness becomes the one remaining “truly existent” principle, which stands in tension with teachings that apply emptiness to all phenomena without exception. This, in turn, raises questions about other minds: if all that is encountered is one’s own stream of consciousness, the status of other sentient beings can seem precarious, and the very basis of compassion and moral responsibility appears threatened, at least on a conventional level.

Related to this is the problem of the external world and shared experience. Critics ask how the remarkable consistency of the world and the intersubjective agreement about objects can be explained if there is no external reality that serves as a common reference point. When all phenomena are treated as mental constructs, it becomes difficult to articulate clear criteria for distinguishing valid cognition from delusion, since there is no independent world “out there” to check experience against. This leads some to argue that Yogācāra runs into self‑referential trouble: if every theory is just another projection of consciousness, the claim that “all is mind” has no special epistemic privilege over any other projection.

A further line of criticism focuses on the Yogācāra model of consciousness itself, especially the notion of a “storehouse consciousness” (ālaya‑vijñāna) that carries karmic seeds. Opponents suggest that this begins to resemble a subtle, enduring substrate, functionally close to a self, and therefore conflicts with the doctrine of non‑self. Even when Yogācārins insist that this storehouse is also empty and conditioned, the very act of positing such a foundational layer is seen by some as an unnecessary complication of Buddhist psychology. From more austere perspectives, the traditional analysis in terms of aggregates and dependent origination is regarded as sufficient, without multiplying types of consciousness and latent seeds.

Finally, there are doctrinal and hermeneutical concerns raised from within the Buddhist fold. Some hold that “mind‑only” scriptures should be read as provisional teachings, meant to correct naïve realism rather than to establish a final ontology of consciousness. From this vantage point, Yogācāra is viewed as a powerful but incomplete step that must be integrated into a more thoroughgoing understanding of emptiness, where even mind is not granted any privileged status. In several traditions, Yogācāra insights are therefore appreciated yet subordinated to broader frameworks that seek to avoid any subtle clinging to an ultimate ground, whether material or mental.