Nagarjuna’s concept of emptiness, or shunyata, occupies a pivotal place in Buddhist philosophy, particularly within the Madhyamaka tradition. This doctrine asserts that all phenomena lack inherent existence or self-nature, challenging deeply rooted assumptions about the solidity and permanence of the world. Yet, this radical insight has not been without its detractors, who have raised searching criticisms that continue to animate philosophical discourse. Foremost among these is the charge of nihilism. Critics contend that if all things are empty of inherent existence, the doctrine risks collapsing into a denial of reality itself, thereby undermining the basis for ethical behavior, spiritual practice, and even the meaningfulness of experience. Such interpretations suggest that emptiness, misunderstood as sheer negation, could erode the foundations of morality and the pursuit of liberation. However, proponents of Madhyamaka have emphasized that emptiness does not equate to nothingness, but rather points to the absence of fixed, independent essence while affirming the conventional reality of phenomena. Another profound criticism concerns the self-referential nature of emptiness. If all concepts are empty, then the concept of emptiness itself must also be empty, presenting a paradox that some argue threatens the coherence of the entire philosophical system. This “emptiness of emptiness” has been a subject of both critique and subtle defense within Buddhist thought, with Nagarjuna himself suggesting that emptiness is not a thing to be grasped but a lens through which reality is understood beyond the confines of conceptual elaboration. The practicality of applying emptiness in daily life has also been questioned. Some argue that the doctrine is excessively abstract and difficult to integrate into ordinary activities such as teaching, ethical conduct, or spiritual development. The concern is that if all phenomena are ultimately empty, conventional truths and values may lose their significance, rendering the path to awakening inaccessible or impractical for most individuals. Further critiques arise from alternative Buddhist schools, particularly those with realist leanings. These critics maintain that some degree of inherent nature is necessary to account for the continuity of karmic effects and the persistence of phenomena across time. Without this, they argue, the causal efficacy central to Buddhist soteriology becomes unintelligible. Additionally, the two-truths doctrine—distinguishing between conventional and ultimate reality—has been accused of sowing confusion rather than providing clarity, making it difficult to articulate a coherent understanding of everyday experience. Despite these searching criticisms, the concept of emptiness remains a profound and transformative insight within Buddhist philosophy. It