Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy, with its profound exploration of emptiness (śūnyatā), has long occupied a central place in Mahayana Buddhist thought. Yet, the very depth and radical nature of his teachings have given rise to a spectrum of criticisms, both from within Buddhist traditions and from external philosophical perspectives. Central among these is the charge of nihilism: by declaring that all phenomena are empty of inherent existence, some critics contend that Nagarjuna risks undermining the very possibility of meaning, morality, and spiritual progress. If nothing possesses any intrinsic reality, the foundations of karma, ethical responsibility, and even the efficacy of Buddhist practice appear to be called into question.

Another significant criticism concerns the logical structure of Nagarjuna’s arguments. His use of the tetralemma and the assertion that all things, including his own statements, are empty, have been seen by some as leading to self-refutation or logical paradox. If the claim that “everything is empty” is itself empty, it seems to undermine its own validity. This has led to accusations of incoherence and of violating basic logical principles, prompting some to question whether the Madhyamaka approach can offer a stable philosophical footing.

The practical implications of Nagarjuna’s teachings have also been a source of concern. The radical deconstruction of concepts and categories, while intended to liberate the mind from attachment, is sometimes viewed as so abstract and rarefied that it risks discouraging genuine ethical conduct or spiritual effort. Critics argue that such emphasis on emptiness can foster philosophical paralysis or disengagement from the world, rather than encouraging active compassion and moral responsibility.

Furthermore, the distinction Nagarjuna draws between conventional and ultimate truth has not escaped scrutiny. Some maintain that this two truths doctrine, while intended to avoid the pitfalls of nihilism, may itself be incoherent or create further conceptual difficulties. There are those who argue that it can lead to a misunderstanding of conventional reality, causing practitioners to disregard the significance of everyday experience and practical concerns.

These varied critiques reflect both the boldness and the complexity of Nagarjuna’s philosophical vision. They reveal the challenges inherent in articulating a middle way that avoids both eternalism and nihilism, and they underscore the enduring debate over how best to interpret and apply the insights of emptiness within the broader context of Buddhist thought and practice.